Why Linking the Banyamulenge to M23 Is Dangerous — and Wrong

Banyamulenge civilians forced to leave Uvira towards Kamanyola.

In January 2026, a U.S. Congressional hearing on peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda briefly shone a spotlight on the Banyamulenge — a Congolese Tutsi minority community in South Kivu that has endured years of violence, displacement, and international neglect. But the moment of recognition carried a dangerous flaw: the Banyamulenge were referred to as a community that “supports M23.” That association is not just factually wrong — it is politically dangerous. Conflating an entire civilian ethnic community with an armed rebel movement obscures the real history of Banyamulenge resistance to M23, dilutes the responsibility of those who have committed violence against them, and risks legitimising further attacks on civilians as “reprisals.” This article examines the evidence, traces the history of Banyamulenge relations with rebel groups from CNDP to M23, and explains why accuracy in this distinction is not merely academic — it is a matter of life and death.

  1. Congressional Hearing

On January 22, 2026, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee held a hearing in Washington, D.C., titled “Advancing Peace in DRC and Rwanda through President Trump’s Washington Accords.”  During the hearing, Rep. Sarah Jacobs, the single Representative who referred to the question of the Banyamulenge, claimed that “… and, we are now receiving reports of reprisal attacks against the Banyamulenge, a Congolese Tutsi community and other civilians accused of supporting M23 by the Wazalendo and other…” Thanks for her courage to speak up on behalf of voiceless. However, the association of the Banyamulenge with M23 is dangerous but also unsubstantiated and may seem to justify violence against at-risk civilians.

  1. CNDP to (2012-13) M23

M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) is an offspring of Conseil National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) of Laurent Nkunda. Since 2009, Nkunda has been in prison in Rwanda. CNDP and M23 claim to act in defense of Tutsi populations in the eastern Congo. However, it has been documented that the Banyamulenge have reluctantly joined CNDP (one or two military officers) and have largely rejected the M23 (2012-13). Banyamulenge Military officers, within the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), have been at the frontline to combat CNDP and M23.

While Banyamulenge, political and military elite can differently interpret discrimination and persecution of their community and Congolese Tutsi in general, many rejected CNDP and M23 due to how “AFDL and RCD rebellion have brewed distrust against Rwanda, which many [believed was] behind the M23 rebellion.” Besides individual ambitions, community leaders, elders, and civil society representatives have in addition emphasized peaceful resolution of local conflicts.

  1. Hardly convinced to “subscribe” to M23 (2021)

Despite Banyamulenge elite (military and politicians) opposition to CNDP and M23, their security has continuously deteriorated. Civilian populations in southern South Kivu (Fizi, Mwenga-Itombwe, and Uvira territories) have been attacked, villages and cattle destroyed. Their security situation has not changed even when the last structured armed group integrated the FARDC in 2010-11. Instead, their security situation drastically deteriorated from 2017 onwards. The 2017 violence has been unique in terms of destruction of homes, cattle and social infrastructure.

The security situation worsened sharply in 2019, forcing Banyamulenge to fend for themselves. Despite their precarious condition, Banyamulenge resisted pressure to join the M23 until the end of 2022. Community organizations became divided, as a significant number refused to support the rebel group collectively. Efforts to persuade the elite, alongside coercion from Rwandan security services, did not succeed easily. Many remain hesitant, recalling their experiences with previous rebellions and Rwanda’s suspected links to Burundian rebels, Red-Tabara, who had also actively contributed to the 2017 destruction.
The quest for survival might have pushed some to remotely join the rebel group. Until the capture of Uvira and the assassination of Col Michel Rukunda Makanika (Feb 2025), the Banyamulenge have hesitated to publicly claim that they have joined M23. Nonetheless, there is no credible evidence demonstrating collective mobilization or endorsement of M23 by the community.
Speaking with a member of the Banyamulenge community,  the New Humanitarian reported in November 2025 that
People think that the entire community is associated with the M23,” said a Banyamulenge civil society leader. “This is not true. We remain loyal to our government and to our homeland. However, our authorities must take measures to protect us.”
  1. “Association with M23” dilutes perpetrators’ responsibility

A collective association of the Banyamulenge community with M23 reminds the false association and collective guilty they have been accused of in relation to P5-Rwanda National Congress (RNC) of General Kayumba Nyamwasa. The 2015 regional confrontation between Rwanda and Burundi, new rebel groups emerged in South Kivu, including Red-Tabara. The Burundian rebel groups actively operating alongside local militias in southern South Kivu. Evidence indicates that Red-Tabara received logistical and financial support from Rwandan security services. Meanwhile, Burundian security services backed Rwandan rebels affiliated to Kagame’s opponent, General Kayumba Nyamwasa known as P5-RNC.

Nduhungirehe and 2019 violence in South Kivu
When confronted with the reality that Red-Tabara has partaken in destroying the Banyamulenge homeland, supporters of this group and the Rwandan media, standing as mouthpiece, tend to collectively blame the Banyamulenge for coalescing with P5-RNC.

Rather than calling for civilian protection, Media outlets diverted attention to countries’ political and security interests. Since then, the plight of the Banyamulenge civilians who lost almost everything is subsumed in this debate of armed groups’ confrontation. Perpetrators’ responsibilities are diluted in this discourse and narrative that rewards the killers. Associating the Banyamulenge with M23 rewards perpetrators of violence, as their actions are perceived as reprisal attacks.

  1. Risks behind the Dangerous Association
The assertion that the Banyamulenge community supports the M23 rebellion lacks factual foundation and oversimplifies a complex social and political reality. A careful and balanced analysis, therefore, confirms that the Banyamulenge did not support M23 as a community.
The Banyamulenge are a Congolese ethnic group composed of individuals with diverse political views, social interests, and experiences. As such, it is inaccurate and misleading to attribute the actions of an armed movement to the collective will of an entire community. Conflating the Banyamulenge with M23 distorts the historical record. It reinforces harmful stereotypes that contribute to the worsening of at-risk civilians.

 

Delphin R. Ntanyoma

Twitter: https://x.com/Delphino12

Blog: https://easterncongotribune.com/

About Eastern Congo Tribune 492 Articles
Eastern Congo Tribune is an independent news and analysis publication covering the Eastern Congo, African Great Lakes region, and the African political developments. Eastern Congo Tribune was founded in 2013 by Delphin R. Ntanyoma, a Congolese PhD researcher and currently visiting fellow at the University of Leeds and the editor. The platform advocates for #Justice4All in #DRC.

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