DRC: Blackwater, Drones, and the Escalating War in Minembwe – South Kivu

Erik Prince. Credit https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Erik_Prince_(54359572482)_(cropped).jpg

Had a private military contractor such as Blackwater been recruited earlier to counter armed groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Cooperative pour le Développement du Congo (CODECO), RED-Tabara and allied MaiMai militias, and later the M23, the security landscape in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might look markedly different today. In such a scenario, the conflict in the Minembwe highlands may never have evolved into its current situation—characterised by fragmented armed confrontations, regional proxy dynamics, and the growing use of drones and other sophisticated equipment. The danger behind this high-tech warfare is that Blackwater is empowering militias that specifically target civilians because of their ethnic affiliation.

Blackwater in Minembwe

In a controversial framing, Shabani Lukoo, the DRC’s Home Affairs minister, posted the words “black water” in September 2025. His post triggering widespread speculation about the possible involvement of foreign private military contractors. Some observers suggested that Kinshasa might be turning to a new “generation” of mercenaries—this time allegedly linked to Erik Prince—following earlier reliance on foreign security actors in North Kivu.

Social media platforms have become a tactical battleground for online and ground belligerents. Beyond sensational narratives, a more pressing concern is the increasing use of sophisticated military technologies in areas with limited media visibility. The deployment of drones and heavy weaponry in remote highland zones such as Minembwe risks significantly worsening the humanitarian situation, particularly for civilians caught between multiple armed actors.

Contractors associated with Erik Prince, founder of the controversial private security firm formerly known as Blackwater, have been involved in securing minerals in the DRC. However, emerging reports suggest that the contractors have provided drone operations and tactical support to Congolese special operations units. According to Reuters, contractors reportedly provided drone support to Congolese special operations forces and the army against M23 rebels in Uvira and the South Kivu highlands.” —a geographic area that includes, and in some interpretations directly refers to, the Minembwe plateau.

Conflict Dynamics in Minembwe

In and around Minembwe, intense clashes have pitted Mouvement Republicain pour la Dignite des Peuples (MRDP-Twirwaneho) combatants against a broad coalition composed of FARDC units, MaiMai-Wazalendo militias, and Burundian army elements (FDNB). This coalition, estimated in thousands, is reportedly supported by advanced military capabilities, including drone surveillance and strike capacity allegedly managed with the assistance of specialised foreign contractors. Based on recent information, they are technologically and numerically outnumbering MRDP-Twirwaneho combatants.

While some sources indicate that foreign contractors remained visible in Uvira and Baraka, Reuters reporting suggested that their presence may have been reduced, with a shift toward other missions such as securing mining-related revenue streams. Reuters reported that [Blackwater] has since withdrawn and returned to its primary mission, which is improving revenue collection from mining.”

Until recently, Twirwaneho cmbatants largely operated in a defensive posture. Internal disagreements were reported between Sematama-Twirwaneho elements and AFC/M23 leadership, raising uncertainty about the extent of possible military backing and whether Rwanda would directly support Charles Sematama’s command structure. Military pressure on the ground will likely push Sematama and his group to opt for a soft attitude vis-a-vis allies. Sematama, now seen as a key commander of MRDP-Twirwaneho, leads a group of combatants often seen as engaged to protect the  Banyamulenge civilians.

Escalation Since 2026

Violence in the Minembwe highlands has intensified in recent years. Following the withdrawal of M23 elements from Uvira, armed confrontations escalated sharply in mid-January 2026 as FARDC and pro-government Wazalendo militias, supported by Burundian forces, launched offensives to control strategic villages around Minembwe and the high plateau. Heavy fighting has been reported in localities such as Point Zéro, Kalingi, Rubemba, Rugezi, and surrounding areas.

Government forces have reportedly deployed attack drones for surveillance and strike operations, with concerning reports of civilian harm in affected villages. The near-total communication blackout in the region—marked by limited telecommunications and internet access—has further obscured the humanitarian toll, even as clashes approached populated areas such as Kalingi and Rubemba, forcing waves of civilian displacement. It is now hard to know on the time what is happening in Minembwe.

Background Context

The violence affecting Minembwe predates the re-emergence of M23 in 2022. Between 2017 and 2022, repeated attacks targeted civilians, particularly members of the Banyamulenge community. Militias affiliated to self-styled authochthonous ethnic communities: Babembe, Bafuliro, Bavira and Banyindu… portray the Banyamulenge as “foreigners” or “invaders”, and this belief drives violence against members of this community.

Many of these earlier attacks were attributed to local MaiMai factions and allied groups, some of which later became associated with the Wazalendo umbrella. These local militias operated alongside Burundian rebel elements, notably RED-Tabara, a group opposed to the Burundian government. Attacks occured and were triggered by regional conflict and notably the proxy warfare between Rwanda and Burundi. Rwanda backed Red-Tabara as Burundi aligned with FDLR. During this period, civilians experienced killings, village destruction, and cattle raids, contributing to cycles of displacement and militarisation.

These sustained attacks prompted the formation and expansion of self-defence groups, including Twirwaneho. By 2025, Charles Sematama’s alignment with the AFC/M23 coalition marked a significant political and military shift, transforming what had been largely localised self-defence mobilisation into part of a broader regional confrontation.

Risks of sophisticated and technological warfare

The reported use of private contractors and drone warfare in the South Kivu highlands introduces a new and deeply concerning dimension to the conflict. Supporters argue that such assistance strengthens state capacity and helped secure strategic towns like Uvira. However, resort to mercenaries and private military contratctors is now leading to violence escalation, reducing accountability, and further exacerbating the regional conflicts.

If advanced military technologies are used in densely populated rural zones, the likelihood of indiscriminate harm to civilians increases significantly. In an already polarised environment marked by ethnic tensions, militia rivalries, and regional geopolitical competition, the integration of mercenary expertise and drone warfare may prolong the conflict rather than resolve it. Empowering militarily, among other belligerents, militias with beliefs that some communities are not entitled to live in the DRC is highly dangerous and someone should consider accountability.

Ultimately, the situation in Minembwe illustrates the dangerous convergence of local grievances, regional proxy dynamics, and increasingly sophisticated methods of warfare. As drones operate overhead and ground battles intensify across the high plateau, civilians remain the primary victims—facing displacement, insecurity, and a deepening humanitarian crisis amid a largely underreported war.

Delphin R. Ntanyoma 

Twitter: https://x.com/Delphino12  

Blog: https://easterncongotribune.com/ 

About Delphin 486 Articles
PhD & Visiting researcher @POLISatLeeds, proud of being a "villageois". My interest: Peace, conflict, Genocide Studies, Minority ethnic groups, DRC, African Great Lakes region. Congolese, blogger & advocate #Justice4All in #DRC.

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