As war and fighting are causing unprecedented humanitarian crises in North Kivu and South Kivu, I came across an interesting article by Wedaeli Chibelushi, a British Broadcast Corporation journalist. Wedaeli Chibelushi warns that Sultani Makenga, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) military wing could end up in jail. See the article here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgq0gxp04q2o.
One can read in the BBC’s article that
The origins of this complex conflict can be understood through the story of one man – M23 leader Sultani Makenga, who is the subject of various war crime allegations.
A claim that the conflict in North Kivu and possibly around M23 is a “one-man issue” is highly oversimplified. However, readers should recall that the fate of the three predecessors of Makenga indicates that the latter could end up like them. This is possible not because the conflict in North Kivu and around M23 is Makenga’s personal issue. He is an aggrieved and weak rebel leader. Powerful people can exploit his vulnerable position and dump him whenever it becomes harder to carry on.
1. Fate of Makenga’s Predecessors
The three predecessors of Sultani Makenga are: Lieutenant Murekezi, Gen Ntaganda, and Gen Laurent Nkunda. In July 2019, Gen Bosco Ntaganda was found guilty “beyond reasonable doubt” and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ntaganda is expected to be released in 2049 (24 years to go) and he is currently serving his sentence in Belgium. Whether true or not, we came to learn that the Congolese General Bosco Ntaganda was a Rwandan citizen who might have fled to DRC in the 1980s.
Following years of fighting claiming to protect members of his community, Gen Laurent Nkunda ended up in jail (one might say). In September 2009, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo secured a deal to end fighting in North Kivu as the two countries’ interests were largely met (at that time). Rwanda and DRC agreed that Gen Laurent Nkunda should be arrested and placed in a “safe-house” in Rwanda. Meanwhile, he was replaced by Gen Bosco Ntaganda who orchestrated a sort of “military coup” within the rebel group, National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). 16 years now, it is hard to know Laurent Nkunda’s fate.
2. Aggrieved and Weak rebel Leaders
Informed sources tend to believe that Sultani Makenga, Bosco Ntaganda (to some extent), and mostly Laurent Nkunda have all been inspired by the late Lieutenant Murekezi. Murekezi’s background and story is found in Stearns (2012). By 1996-1997, Murekezi had tried to oppose Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) influence over Tutsi and Hutu from North Kivu. These Hutu-Tutsi soldiers from North Kivu who were engaged in the AFDL campaign had been kept in a dilemma of choice. From RPA perspective, most of these soldiers Kinyarwanda’s speakers from Masisi, Goma, Rutshuru were considered as part of their forces. This perspective has undermined RPA-Banyamulenge’s relations in South Kivu.
All along the Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo/Zaire (AFDL) campaign, Hutu-Tutsi from North Kivu had been ordered to go back to Rwanda joining RPA withdrawal. The prominent Murekezi organized a type of mutiny to decline (oppose) this forced belonging. Murekezi who is from Rutshuru as Nkunda [and Makenga] managed to reorganize in protest hundreds of soldiers in Goma. These soldiers were unilaterally deserting their military units from Kigali-Ruhengeri towards Goma. Those deserting comprised mostly soldiers who have enrolled into RPA.
Makenga, Ntaganda, Nkunda, and Murekezi all have enrolled in the RPA for different motives including a probable to defend their rights as Congolese citizens on Congolese soil. While contesting their forced return to Rwanda again, Murekezi took an exemplary step of leaving RPA unit to find a base in Goma. He started receiving supporters who came as deserters. Mutineers that followed Murekezi were mainly native of North-Kivu serving within the Republican guards. They then constituted a threatening force in the eyes of RPA that had to be neutralized. RPA officers undertook a type of malicious negotiation (you should do that). From May 1997, through James Kabarebe, RPA had a full control over the Rwandan army but also the Congo one (under Laurent Kabila’s reign).
#Makenga: DRC rebel leader whose fighters have created turmoil. In 1997 “…he was arrested by the Rwandan authorities after refusing orders to return to Rwanda….” Aggrieved rebel leaders without control of what they do, I call it “double vulnerability”. https://twitter.com/Delphino12/status/1889221998678823161
3. Murekezi’s Brutal End.
Col James Kabarebe and many other RPA officers flew from Kinshasa and Kigali to Goma. They started negotiating with the mutineers. This led to an agreement of a military gathering to have their complaints expressed. It was during the military gathering, ordered by Congo’s Army Chief of Staff James Kabarebe, that a decision to shoot Lt Murekezi was taken. Murekezi and a few others were shot dead on the spot. After Murekezi firing, his colleagues and followers were disarmed and taken to prison in Rwanda, namely in Iwawa Island. This type of extrajudicial killing was decided without any formal trial to create fear among Murekezi’s followers. The decision was likely taken to serve as a strong sign sent to them to halt any further attempt to oppose the RPA.
Most of them were released within a few months though their commanders had remained in prison for roughly a year. Commanders were released in early August when the new rebel group, RCD, was launched. The launch of the new rebellion reshaped the political landscape as it needed these commanders and soldiers to support military campaigns. Murekezi colleagues and followers comprised Laurent Nkunda, Bosco Ntaganda, Sultani Makenga, Ngabo, Kabayiza… Besides Nkunda who only served in the CNDP, most of these commanders have occupied important positions within CNDP as well as M23. Hence, they constituted major pillars of North Kivu insurgencies.¹
Conclusion
I argued in my article (short argument) published in the Conversation that “Efforts to stabilise eastern DRC should dissociate Rwanda’s grievances from those of the M23.” While it is important to hold all actors (individuals and groups) accountable, I am afraid that failing to tackle the root causes of the conflict places some individuals and groups in a vulnerable position that could endlessly be exploited for political gains and countries’ interests. It won’t make sense to arrest and jail a rebel commander while leaving room for another one to be recruited within five or ten years to come.
Eastern Congo Tribune team
Notes
- Disclaimer: Section 2 and 3 were extracted from the book “Behind the Scenes of the Banyamulenge ‘Military’: Momentum, Myth, and Extinction”, pages: 122-23 (see the link to the book: https://liseuse.harmattan.fr/9782343186979)
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