Shortfalls of DRC – AFC & Rwanda Peace Processes: Regional Competitions

On 27 June 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, aiming to end military confrontations and stabilise the Eastern DRC. Today, on 15 November 2025, the DRC and the rebel group Congo River Alliance (Alliance Fleuve Congo – AFC)―M23 (movement du 23 Mars) signed a framework for peace in Doha, Qatar. World leaders, including French President, Emmanuel Macron commended and praised this step and the commitment of the Qatari authorities.

Je salue l’accord signé à Doha entre la RDC et le M23. Après tant de souffrances, une véritable ouverture pour la paix et une lueur d’espoir pour tous.

Merci à toutes les parties pour leur esprit constructif et au Qatar pour son rôle déterminant.…

— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) November 15, 2025

However, the Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry (MOFA) signals that the framework for peace contains 8 protocols that will be deeply discussed in a near future. The protocols include: restoring state authority, reforms, arrangements for inclusive national governance, issues of identity and citizenship, return and resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as economic recovery and enhancement of social services.” The MOFA’s communique underscores that the “framework does not represent the end of the road, but rather the beginning of a comprehensive peace process and rounds of negotiations … to discuss several core issues.”

It is expected that the DRC’s President Felix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda are due to soon be invited in Washington to sign the agreement as a sign of making peace between the hostile neighbours. Negotiations to stabilise the Eastern DRC rest on three economic and peace deals between the DRC and Rwanda, the DRC and AFC/M23, and finally the mineral deal between the DRC and the United States. This argument highlights two shortfalls that could undermine delivering peace and stability in the Eastern DRC:  the protection of minorities and the African Great Lakes regional competition ― military confrontations.

1. Introduction

The conflict-prone Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced persistent violent conflicts where multiple actors are motivated by various interests and motives. Millions have died due to (in)direct consequences of the ongoing violence. The neighbours, DRC and Rwanda, have repeatedly and mutually accused of messing up in their internal affairs. Recent clashes between the DRC and rebel groups backed by Rwanda have pushed millions to flee their homes, leading to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Numerous regional and African efforts to mediate between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have failed to bring President Felix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame to the negotiation table. In March 2025, the media announced that the DRC and the United States are in discussions about a Ukraine-like mineral deal and enabling US investment in the region.

In early April 2025, a high-ranking US delegation visited the African Great Lakes region to resume peace talks among key stakeholders. On April 25, 2025, DRC and Rwanda signed a declaration of principles in Washington that was followed by technical work to finalise the peace agreement between the two countries.  June 27, 2025, DRC and Rwanda’s foreign ministers signed a peace deal that may largely be attributed to the Trump administration’s efforts to end the decades-long conflict in DRC. Following the signing of the peace deal, President Trump declared that

“Today, the violence and destruction come to an end. The entire region begins a new chapter of hope and opportunity, harmony, prosperity, and peace. That’s been a long time waiting.”

The signing of the Washington peace agreement was applauded by several political leaders within the international community, including the UN Secretary General, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the African Union, Angola, and many other countries.

Although there have been several agreements between the DRC and Rwanda, as well as between the DRC and rebel groups in the past, the signing of the peace agreement is a commendable development. The question today is whether this time the Eastern DRC will begin a path toward stability.

2. Unresolved grievances within the African Great Lakes Region

• Under the long-serving President Mobutu, DRC (then Zaire) embarked on the democratisation and multipartyism process in the 1990s.
• In 1994, Rwanda experienced an unprecedented human tragedy that killed around a million Rwandan of ethnic Tutsi killed by Hutu militias. The Hutu militias fled to the DRC.
• In 1997, Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), a rebel group led by Laurent Kabila supported by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and other regional countries, managed to topple President Mobutu (32 years in power).
• In 1998, Rwanda and Uganda intervened again in the DRC in support of other rebel groups to overthrow President Laurent Kabila.
• In 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, who ruled over the DRC for roughly 18 years.
• In 2002, an “inclusive agreement” was signed in Sun City (South Africa) to end the 1998 conflict.
• Between 2004 and 2009, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) of General Laurent Nkunda waged another rebellion in North Kivu, claiming to protect the Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge.
• On 23^rd March 2009, a peace accord was signed between the DRC and Rwanda, but also between the DRC and the CNDP.
• In 2012, another rebel group erupted, namely the Mouvement du M23 Mars (the current M23), to claim the full implementation of the March 23^rd, 2009 peace agreement.
• In 2013, under huge international pressure on Rwanda that was believed to back M23, the rebel group was defeated by the Congolese, the United Nations and the Southern African Development Community regional force, and MONUSCO.
• In December 2013, following the “defeat” of M23, another peace deal was signed in Nairobi between the DRC government and M23.
• Following the flawed 2018 Congolese general elections in the DRC and the advent of the incumbent President Felix Tshisekedi to power, Rwanda and the DRC have had good bilateral and economic relations. The end of the flawed electoral process in the DRC was marked by signing another deal that involved regional actors, and the African Union Chairperson was aware of.
• The DRC and Rwanda bilateral relations soared in 2021 following the former’s decision to allow Uganda to intervene militarily to fight the Islamist group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), including the construction of infrastructure and roads in North Kivu.
• Meanwhile, the Banyamulenge in South Kivu, Congolese Tutsi, and the Hema in Ituri were being hunted down by local and foreign militias with the support of the Congolese army.
• Recent reports tend to indicate that Rwanda has deployed more than 7,000 military soldiers and has been coordinating the rebel group’s military operations.

3. Failure of previous peace accords

In Africa, the DRC is the largest unconnected territory of 2,345,000 Km² with no viable infrastructure. For nearly four decades, the Eastern DRC has been unstable. Conflicts in the Eastern DRC are extremely complex. There is no single explanation for it because actors and players have different (intertwined) motivations and interests. More specifically, micro-level and local violence in Eastern DRC (North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri) is not entirely and exclusively driven by greed motivations, the accumulation of material resources.

From 2002 to 2018 flawed electoral process, previous accords were likely designed to fit the political elite and military rulers’ ambitions. The 2002 Sun City peace agreement brought together several parties in the conflict (1+4 formula) whose ambitions were mainly to control and share influential governmental positions in the capital city, Kinshasa. Newly appointed rulers fought to win the presidential and parliamentary races in 2006, 2009, and 2018. Rulers are corrupted, and the elite classes have worked more to accumulate resources for personal gain. The debate to reinforce the local governance in remote areas of the DRC was pushed into the background. From 2002 up to now, the DRC has organised three general (presidential and parliamentary) elections with no single local or municipal elections.

The DRC has failed to restructure the Congolese security services (the army and the police). The weak and dysfunctional security services have largely failed to protect civilians, and insecurity has become rampant across the Eastern DRC. In the name of sovereignty protection, Congolese rulers have not internalised efforts to restructure the Congolese security services. DRC’s security services are largely among the brokers of violence against civilians. Failure to protect civilians has led communities to organise armed groups that, in turn, cause havoc across communities. Next to that, the Congolese judicial system and many of the state institutions are likely non-existent or less independent vis-à-vis rulers. Though the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would have contributed to creating harmony and reinforcing justice, rulers did not express interest in it at the end of its mandate in 2007.

Meanwhile, the DRC has been experiencing insurgencies and the proliferation of armed groups. The 2009 and 2013 experiences show additionally that DRC and Rwanda adopted strategies to circumvent deals with rebels. In some cases, both countries worked together to weaken rebel groups when they managed to find common ground to the detriment of the rebels. Therefore, rebel groups had limited choices rather than waiting for another opportunity to fight in the future.

4. Peace agreements shortfalls

Negotiations between the DRC government and AFC-M23 in good faith will determine the future and the stability of the Eastern Congo.

#RDC: Signature d’un texte entre Kinshasa et l’AFC/M23 pic.twitter.com/qRGO5m62qT

— Stanis Bujakera Tshiamala (@StanysBujakera) November 15, 2025

4.1 Community voices and the protection of ethnic minorities

Micro-level research indicates that individuals, groups, and communities take up guns not exclusively to gain financial materials. Communities’ grievances include protecting relatives, fighting predatory regimes, the sense of nationalism, and the protection of land against those perceived as “invaders”. Even those claiming to expect material gains during war times, their socio-economic characteristics indicated they are fighting to exclusively accumulate resources. The Eastern DRC has countless number of armed groups whose claims and “grievances” count in the stability of this region. Local communities need assurance that wars and fighting will not resurge in five or seven years ahead. I believe, Congolese communities across South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri have a lot to claim if offered safe spaces to express themselves. They have suffered from injustices and Kinshasa’s power concentrations.

The socio-cultural context and the colonial legacy have polarized local communities. The exclusionary sense of belonging to the Congolese state is still dominant in the minds of many. Some ethnic minorities are facing an existential threat and, in many cases, experiencing slow genocide because they are affiliated with the Nilotic and Tutsi in the African Great Lakes region. While historically embedded in the colonial misrepresentations of the ethnic communities, the Hema in Ituri, Congolese Tutsi and Hutu in North Kivu and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu are still perceived and portrayed as foreigners and invaders. Violence against these groups has something in common: perpetrators intend to get rid of them or eliminate them. Recent violence in Ituri and South Kivu (from 2017 onwards) shows that they are at risk of being wiped out.

Any efforts to stabilize the Eastern Congo need to pay attention to these issues. Lastly, the US, as well as the international community, should consider to immediately ending the persecution of ethnic minorities in the Eastern DRC. Members of these ethnic minorities have been persecuted and marginalized because they are seen as “foreigners and invaders” in their own country. This is one of the key challenges for lasting peace in the DRC and across the African Great Lakes region. For instance, the Congolese armed forces and Burundian army, and MRDP/AFC-M23) had been mutually shifting blame, and claim that possible attacks against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu will be carried out by the other group.

3.2 The Congolese army & the regional conflict 

The DRC-Rwanda (DRC-AFC/M23) peace agreements should consider a comprehensive scope of the conflict. At the regional level, the African Great Lakes region, there is a need to consider intense and frank discussions between Rwanda and Burundi, between Rwanda and Uganda, but also among the four countries, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

Following the 2015 contestation and failed military coup, Burundi and Rwanda’s diplomatic and bilateral relations have largely soured. As of today, the border between the two countries is closed. Burundi accuses Rwanda of supporting its opponents, while Rwanda dismisses this and claims Burundi is arming forces hostile to Rwanda. Such mutual accusations seem to expand as Burundi deploys several military units in South Kivu to what Burundian authorities claim is to protect its birders against Rwandan invasion. While Uganda and Rwanda’s relations are perceived as good for the time being, evidence shows that in recent years, the two countries have competed and seem to have divergent interests in the DRC.

Internally, the stability of the Eastern DRC is highly entangled with solving DRC governance issues, including security services reform to create an army and the police with the ability and knowledge to protect all civilians. The Congolese army is extremely corrupt, weak, and dysfunctional. Military generals and senior officers are involved in smuggling minerals but also are accused of collaborating with armed groups. Its weaknesses and imperfections facilitate regional countries to easily intervene in the DRC. As a matter of fact, the failure to curb the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has led the DRC to invite the Ugandan army into military operations in Ituri. Meanwhile, the Burundian army is also intervening in South Kivu and fighting the rebel group, M23. These are questions to be considered when it comes to stabilizing the Eastern DRC.

5. What should include a “good” peace deal?

Local Congolese are yearning for peace! Many past initiatives were unsuccessful.  Understanding the eastern DRC context is very important for whoever is willing to contribute to stability and provide a long-lasting solution for the crisis in this region.  Without addressing these structural challenges, the pact risks collapsing like so many predecessors. Peace in eastern Congo will require far more than paperwork—it demands sustained political will, accountability, and regional solidarity.

I commend the US, Qatari and AU pragmatic diplomacy that pushed key parties in this conflict, Rwanda and the DRC, and the rebel group, to sit and talk. This is a positive step made so far, but I think there is still a lot to do to build trust among parties and other regional countries. The mineral deal between the DRC and the US should not be the end in itself, but possibly a step to find a “guarantor”. The US involvement, with its diplomatic ability to leverage in the African Great Lakes region, may be a game-changer. I base the argument on expectations that the US will keep a close eye on this region and broadly work towards the stability of the DRC as a country.

The Rwanda‑DRC and the forthcoming deep negotiations between DRC government and the rebel groups agreement marks a critical inflection point. Its success hinges on the establishment of credible enforcement mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and the implementation of the accord between the parties.

The US should leverage to ensure that rebel groups, including the M23, are frankly engaged, away from political pressure. DRC should be pushed to undertake institutional reforms, including the army and its security services, while Rwanda should be pushed to improve its human rights record. Without a disciplined army willing to protect all civilians, the return of refugees will take ages. The US needs to diplomatically engage all stakeholders and regional countries to put aside their egos, resolve their grievances, and support this process.

Delphin R. Ntanyoma

Twitter: https://x.com/Delphino12

Blog: https://easterncongotribune.com/