HRW’s Report: Understand the Elimination in Slow Motion

On March 17, 2025, the United Kingdom foreign Office Committee of the House of Commons invited two experts to brief the Committee about the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Richard Moncrieff, Project Director for the Great Lakes Region at the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Dr Michela Wrong, Author and journalist specializing in sub-Saharan Africa were the main speakers. Details of the briefing: https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/6eca481f-1f81-494d-b270-7f79eaab77a6#player-tabs

Throughout this debate, Richard and Michela downplayed the persecution of the Tutsi in the Eastern DRC and largely that of the Banyamulenge in South Kivu. I agree with Richard and Michela on the fact that Rwanda has its own agenda and tends to instrumentalise Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge’s persecution. However, for many decades, it has been clear that members of these communities are targeted because they are perceived as “foreigners” in their own country, the DRC.

One of the ambiguities that emerges from this briefing (as explained below) is the experts’ simplification of the discrimination of Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge, seen from their perspective as an issue purely associated with the existence and resurgence of M23 and the presence of Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) in DRC. Though Rwanda intervenes for its interests, I fail to understand how Riichard can claim that “the areas the M23 is pushing into, SouthKivu and now West… these are areas where Tutsi have not been persecuted”. This misperception is challenged in today’s Human Right Watch’s report.

1. Human Rights Watch Report.

Today, 15 September 2025, Human Rights Watch released a report titled “DR Congo: Militias, Army Threaten South Kivu Civilians”. It highlights the fact that:

The Banyamulenge have long faced discrimination, exclusion, and targeted violence in Congo. Since the 1990s, Congolese political leaders and armed groups questioned the community’s citizenship and portrayed them as outsiders, fueling recurrent persecution. Since the end of the Congo Wars in 2003, cycles of armed conflict in South Kivu continued to expose Banyamulenge civilians to violence, especially as disputes over land, political representation, and control of resources deepened. Mai-Mai militias committed much of this violence.

Two recent reports (the September 2025 and May 2025 describe specifics of atrocities committed against civilians and mostly the Banyamulenge. Militias known as Wazalendo (patriots in Swahili) do not believe that the Banyamulenge and Congolese Tutsi in general have the rights to live in the DRC as Congolese. This is embedded in what is known as “autochthony ideology” that has increasingly become a genocidal ideology. Recently, Wazalendo in Uvira contested openly and publicly the appointment of General Olivier Gasita Olivier because of his community- affiliation. Public announcements and declarations of well-known and sanctioned militias commanders boldly opposed the appointment. HRW remarks that:

Wazalendo fighters have harassed, threatened, abducted, and restricted access to services for members of the Banyamulenge community in Uvira, who are South Kivu-based Congolese Tutsis, accusing them of supporting the M23.

This is not an isolated incident. It is a “common diet” for the discriminated Banyamulenge. In recent years, while M23 was “defeated”, the entire homeland in South Kivu and the Banyamulenge economy were completely destroyed (see details here: https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099).

2. Eastern DRC’s Experts

On 27 June 2025, after watching Richard and Michela’s briefing, I raised my concerns with the Chairperson of the Houses of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee, Rt Hon Emily Thornberry and all the Committee’s members. I emphasized that, based on my research and experience, Richard and Michela fell short in capturing the current situation of the Banyamulenge in South Kivu, but also the Hema in Ituri. I acknowledged that experts were largely correct when considering regional and macro perspectives, but their stances indicate limited knowledge and understanding of the micro-level and local conflicts. In my message, I highlighted four aspects that the Foreign Affairs Committee needs to consider to understanding the local context in South Kivu for instance:

1. It’s extremely awful to downplay the persecution of minorities, and mostly the Banyamulenge in South Kivu. For instance, the International Crisis Group has slightly documented what happened to the Banyamulenge since 2017. There has been an unprecedented destruction echoing a slow genocide, and all attacks intended to get rid of those called “invaders”, the Banyamulenge. This aspect was not touched upon in Richard and Michela’s briefing. Paradoxically, militias attacked the Banyamulenge whose political and military elites (majority) chose to distance themselves from M23 & CNDP (added today)
2. The proliferation of guns into the hands of local militias and armed combatants who believe that their enemies are Banyamulenge and Congolese Tutsi civilians. Richard and Michela talked about the “Wazalendo” phenomenon and the support they receive from the Congolese government. They did not elaborate on how legitimate local militias are now and have received guns and ammunition that are and will be used to harm those they perceive as enemies, “invaders”. In South Kivu, for instance, these guns that were intended to counter M23 and the Rwanda Defense Forces are now used to attack members of the Banyamulenge, whom they wrongly associate with Rwanda and M23. There are now signs that these guns and ammunition are being turned to attack members of the Banyamulenge community, civilians who have been under constant attack by these militias since 2017.
3. Richard and Michela’s conversation did not cover the role of Burundian rebels, namely Red-Tabara, who have been operating in South Kivu since 2016. As part of regional confrontations, namely Burundi and Rwanda (back in 2015), Red-Tabara combatants received logistical and financial support from Rwandan security services. Red-Tabara ended up coalescing with local militias to attack the Banyamulenge. Their presence has largely contributed to worsening the security situation of the Banyamulenge.
4. The Congolese national army (FARDC) is not only an ill-disciplined and under-equipped military, but it also commits violence against minorities! FARDC has consistently attacked the Banyamulenge or collaborated with local militias. There is much evidence that FARDC has worked with local militias in Ituri to attack members of the Hema.

Conclusion

Human Rights Watch’s today report proves that the proliferation of guns and ammunition into the hands of the Eastern DRC’s militias should concern to the international community. The security situation of ethnic minorities in the Eastern DRC, notably in South Kivu, is extremely worrying and there are limited indications that the Washington and Doha peace processes give weight to these underlying problems that have been instrumentalized by regional countries when they decide to fight for their own political and economic interests.

Violence in DRC is complex to the extent that it overshadows the specifics of the persecution of ethnic minorities. These specifics have been overlooked by international organisations, including the UN peacekeeping mission. Diplomatic channels and experts tend to focus mostly on regional conflict and how countries are involved. Consequently, local communities and victims of violence face challenges in getting their voices heard. However, recent publications reveal that ethnic minorities, notably the Banyamulenge are experiencing forms of violence that intended to eliminate and get rid of them. The world should react.

Delphin Ntanyoma

Eastern Congo Tribune